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We examine the mechanics of deterrence and intervention when fear is a motive for conflict. We contrast
results obtained in a complete information setting, where coordination is easy, to those obtained in
a setting with strategic risk, where players have different assessments of their environment. These
two strategic settings allow us to define and distinguish predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants
of conflict. We show that while weapons have an unambiguous deterrent effect under complete information,
this does not hold anymore under strategic risk. Rather, we find that increases in weapon stocks can
have a non-monotonic effect on the sustainability of peace. We also show that under strategic risk,
inequality in military strength can ac- tually facilitate peace and that anticipated peace-keeping interventions
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The usual rationale for deterrence is closely related to the rationale behind grim trigger pun-
ishment in a repeated prisoners' dilemma. Imagine two neighboring groups that repeatedly
decide whether to be peaceful or to launch a surprise attack on the other. A peaceful equi-
librium can only be sustained if the short run gains from a surprise attack are balanced by
the long run costs of triggering con°ict. The logic of deterrence is that as groups accumulate
weapons, the cost of con°ict increases thereby improving incentives for peaceful behavior.
This re°ects the idea frequently highlighted in the literature on repeated games that harsher
punishments should improve incentives for cooperation.1
Although the argument for deterrence is simple and convincing, evidence for the e®ec-
tiveness of deterrence is less than conclusive. On the one hand, there is a general agreement
on the fact that nuclear weapons largely contributed to the absence of direct confrontation in
the Cold War.2 On the other hand, there is an equally wide agreement that the proliferation
of semi-automatic weapons is fuelling the chronic civil wars that plague Africa.3 Why do
the intuitions we obtain from a standard repeated prisoners' dilemma seem to hold in some
settings but not in others? This paper attempts to shed some light on this mixed evidence
by taking seriously the idea of strategic risk.
We model con°ict as a dynamic exit game. In each period, players decide whether to
be peaceful or attack. When both players choose to be peaceful, they enjoy the economic
bene¯ts of peace and the game moves to the next period. However, if one of the players
attacks, con°ict begins and players are assigned exogenous continuation values.4 The essence
of our approach is to contrast how the accumulation of weapons a®ects whether peace is
1See for instance Abreu (1988) on penal codes.
2See, for instance, Jervis (1989).
3Among others, see the Oxfam Report (2007), and Flint and de Waal (2006).
4Because the players' payo®s upon con°ict are exogenously speci¯ed, this game is not a repeated game.
However, trigger strategies of a repeated game are naturally mapped into an exit game in which continuation
values upon con°ict are those that players obtain from repeatedly playing (Attack;Attack). Therefore, this
exit framework is su±ciently °exible to capture the insights we typically obtain from a repeated prisoners'
dilemma.
2sustainable or not under complete information and under strategic risk.
Our model of strategic risk follows the global games literature.5 More precisely, we
consider a situation in which payo®s upon peace depend on an uncertain state of the world
about which players obtain very informative but noisy signals. Because players do not have
the same assessment of the state of the world this creates strategic uncertainty in equilibrium,
so that one player may choose peace while the other one is attacking. As a consequence, the
sustainability of peace will depend both on how tempting attacking a peaceful opponent is {
this is the predatory motive for con°ict { and on how costly it is to be attacked when peaceful
{ this is what we call the preemptive motive for con°ict. In fact, while only predatory motives
matter under complete information, we show that even as the players' information becomes
arbitrarily precise, whether peace is sustainable under incomplete information will depend
signi¯cantly on the magnitudes of both the predatory and the preemptive incentives. The
paper then contrasts comparative statics obtained with and without strategic uncertainty
and highlights how taking into account the preemptive motive for attack enriches and nuances
our intuitions about the determinants of con°ict.
Our ¯rst result considers groups with symmetric stocks of weapons. In this setting
we show that increasing weapon stocks will always have a deterrent e®ect under complete
information but that they may very well be destabilizing under strategic risk. This happens
because upon con°ict, the increased destruction caused by weapons decreases the payo®s of
both the attacker and the victim of the surprise attack. Because they diminish payo®s to
the attacker, weapons reduce the predatory motive for con°ict. However, as the victim of
a surprise attack also fares worse, weapons may increase the bene¯ts of preemptive strikes,
which can result in overall destabilization. We show that under general conditions, the e®ect
of weapons accumulation on peace is non-monotonic and that very destructive weapons
(i.e. nuclear bombs) will typically be deterrent whereas intermediate weapons (i.e. semi-
automatic guns) may be destabilizing.
Our second result explores how inequality in military strength may a®ect the sustain-
5See for instance Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1997).
3ability of peace. We show that unequal military strength always pushes towards con°ict
under complete information but that the picture becomes more nuanced once strategic risk
is introduced. Unequal military strength is destabilizing under complete information be-
cause it increases the predatory temptation of the stronger player. Inequality, however, may
reduce the preemptive motive for con°ict. First, the stronger group knows it has little to
fear from the weaker group. Second, the weaker group knows that it can only gain very little
by launching a preemptive attack. As a consequence, under strategic risk, peace might be
possible between unequal contenders in circumstances under which equally armed opponents
would ¯ght. This result, however should not be interpreted as making a case for complete
monopoly of violence. Indeed, while inequality can help, peace is only sustainable if the
weaker group keeps enough weapons to limit the stronger group's predatory incentives.
Finally, we examine the impact of peace-enforcing interventions on peace and con°ict.6
We ¯rst highlight that under complete information, unless intervention is immediate so that
war is prevented altogether, intervention will always have a destabilizing impact. Indeed, it
is precisely the perspective of a long and painful con°ict that deters groups from attacking.
This conclusion, however, is not robust to strategic risk. By alleviating the costs of being
the victim of a surprise attack, intervention reduces the need for preemptive strikes. In that
setting we show that the promise of intervention may promote peace even if it can only
happen with delay.
Because we examine deterrence in a model where agents are fully rational, this paper
is related to the \realist" strand of the International Relations literature.7 Our model can
actually be seen as formalizing and systematically exploring the impact of \reciprocal fears
of surprise attack" as discussed by Schelling (1960). In that sense, the paper is also related to
the spiral theories of war of Jervis (1976, 1978) and Kydd (1997).8 Our model is also closely
6See Collier et al (2003) for a study of the causes and consequences of civil war. Doyle and Sambanis
(2006) present an analysis of peace-keeping operations.
7This literature includes many non-formal theories of war. For an early formal model in this tradition
see Bueno de Mesquita (1981).
8While these models were originally developed to understand interstate con°ict, Posen(1993) and Snyder
and Jervis(1999) have shown they can also help understand civil wars and ethnic con°ict. We believe our
4related to Baliga and SjÄ ostrÄ om (2004) who analyze the role of cheap talk in a model where
incomplete information about the players' types triggers con°ict via a contagion process.
Our goal in this paper is to highlight the importance of strategic risk when analyzing
the impact of weapons on peace. As a result, we choose to abstract from a number of
other realistic dimensions of con°ict already emphasized in the literature, such as bargain-
ing failures (see Fearon (1995)), leader bias (see Jackson and Morelli (2007)), commitment
problems (see Powell (2004)), or renegotiation issues (in the context of nuclear deterrence
see Schelling (1966), Jervis (1979, 1989) or Powell (1990)).9 Also, unlike Gar¯nkel (1990),
Grossman (1991) or Skaperdas (1992) we do not consider the question of endogenous invest-
ment in weapons. Rather, our purpose here is to revisit a more primitive question: how does
the accumulation of weapons a®ect the sustainability of peace?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the framework and provides neces-
sary and su±cient conditions for the sustainability of peace under complete and incomplete
information. Section 3 contrasts the mechanics of deterrence with and without strategic risk.
Section 4 studies how inequality in military strength a®ects con°ict. Section 5 explores the
impact of intervention on peace. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 The model
2.1 A Simple Model of Peace and Con°ict
We consider two groups i 2 f1;2g that play an in¯nite horizon trust game, with discrete
time t 2 N, and share a common discount factor ±. Each period t, the players simultaneously
decide whether to be peaceful (P) or to attack (A). If both players are peaceful at time t,
they obtain a °ow payo® ¼ and the game moves on to period t+1. When any of the players
attacks, con°ict begins and the players receive exogenously given con°ict payo®s. The stage
results are relevant to the analysis of both types of con°ict.
9Fearon (1995) shows that in the presence of bargaining and transfers, a rational unitary model that yields
war on the equilibrium path needs either private information, bargaining indivisibilities or a commitment
problem. Here we have both private information and commitment problems.




where payo®s are given for row player i, and ki 2 R+ is the stock of weapons held by player
i. Payo® ¼ represents the °ow bene¯ts of peace10, while payo®s F(ki;k¡i), S(ki;k¡i) and
W(ki;k¡i) correspond to the reduced form payo®s group i obtains upon con°ict.11 These
payo®s depend on the timing of attacks. More speci¯cally F(ki;k¡i) denotes the payo®
obtained by group i if it can launch a surprise attack. S(ki;k¡i) is the payo® if group i su®ers
a surprise attack and is therefore a second mover. Finally, W(ki;k¡i) denotes i's payo® when
groups launch simultaneous attacks. We choose to keep these payo®s in a reduced form since
it allows us to remain agnostic about the speci¯c pattern of con°ict. Note that our formalism
is consistent with F, W and S being players' payo®s upon defection when they play trigger
strategies of a repeated prisoners' dilemma.
For simplicity, we will denote Fi = F(ki;k¡i), Si = S(ki;k¡i) and Wi = W(ki;k¡i).
Whenever arm stocks are symmetric (ki = k¡i = k), we will also denote F(k) = F(k;k),
S(k) = S(k;k) and W(k) = W(k;k). The payo® di®erence Fi ¡ 1
1¡±¼ corresponds to the
predatory incentives of player i, that is, how much player i would gain from attacking a
consistently peaceful opponent. The payo® di®erence Wi ¡Si corresponds to the preemptive
incentives of player i, that is, how much player i would gain from attacking a consistently
aggressive opponent. We make the following assumption.
10We look at a situation where the bene¯ts of peace ¼ are symmetric for the purpose of simplicity.
Extending the model to a setting with asymmetric bene¯ts presents no conceptual di±culty.
11These reduced form payo®s summarize the history of ¯ghting that starts after (A) is chosen by a player.
It might help intuition to think of these con°ict payo®s as discounted sums of °ow payo®s that depend on
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6Assumption 1 (First Strike Advantage) For all weapon stocks ki and k¡i, payo®s upon
con°ict are such that F(ki;k¡i) > W(ki;k¡i) > S(ki;k¡i).
Assumption 1 states that there is an advantage in attacking ¯rst and that there is a preemp-
tive motive for war as the payo®s from a simultaneous attack dominate those from being a
second mover.
Throughout the paper, we contrast a situation in which the °ow bene¯ts of peace ¼ are
common knowledge and a situation in which players make private but very precise assess-
ments of the value of ¼. In the ¯rst case, common knowledge of payo®s allows players to
coordinate their actions e®ectively. Under incomplete information however, coordination
becomes di±cult as players attempt to second guess one another's value for peace before
making decisions.
2.2 Peace and Con°ict under Complete Information
By Assumption 1, since Si < Wi, attacking simultaneously is always an equilibrium of the
game whether or not there is incomplete information about ¼. The question of interest,
therefore, is whether or not peace is sustainable. In this section we focus on the case of
complete information: payo® ¼ is ¯xed and common knowledge between players. Let us
denote this game by ¡CI. The following result holds.
Proposition 1 (peace under complete information) Peace is an equilibrium outcome
of ¡CI if and only if
8i 2 f1;2g; Fi ¡
1
1 ¡ ±
¼ · 0: (1)
Furthermore, whenever inequality (1) holds, then permanent peace is sustainable in equilib-
rium.
Recall that the di®erence Fi ¡ 1
1¡±¼ corresponds to the predatory temptation of player i.
It represents how much player i can gain by attacking a peaceful opponent. All that matters
for peace to be sustainable under complete information is that the predatory incentives of
7both players be low enough. Payo®s Si and Wi do not matter in determining whether or not
peace is sustainable.
Let us denote by ¼CI the smallest value of ¼ such that peace is sustainable under complete
information. It follows from Lemma 1 that ¼CI = (1 ¡ ±)maxi Fi. Thus, if Fi is high,
cooperation can only be sustained if the returns to peace are high as well.
2.3 Peace and Con°ict under Strategic Risk
2.3.1 Framework
Under complete information, players never fear the possibility of su®ering a surprise attack.
Indeed, in equilibrium the likelihood of being attacked while peaceful is zero. Our model
of strategic risk follows the literature on global games and introduces the possibility of
miscoordination in equilibrium by considering a situation in which the returns to peace are
not common knowledge.12 More precisely we follow the framework of Chassang (2007) and
consider a slightly perturbed exit game with °ow payo®s
P A
P ~ ¼t Si
A Fi Wi
where ~ ¼t is an i.i.d. random variable with ¯nite variance, distribution f and support
(¡1;+1). This peace payo® ~ ¼t is not directly observable by the players when they make
their decision at time t. Instead, players observe signals of the form xi;t = ~ ¼t + ¾²i;t where
f²i;tgi2f1;2g; t2N is an i.i.d. sequence of centered errors with support [¡1;1]. For simplicity we
assume that ~ ¼t is observable in period t+1 via the °ow payo®s. Let us denote this game by
¡¾;f.
12See for instance Carlsson and van Damme (1993) or Morris and Shin (2003) for an extensive literature
review. Note that for our results it does not matter much whether uncertainty concerns payo® from peace
¼ or the temptation of attack Fi.
82.3.2 Structural properties
In this game, a history hi;t for player i is a sequence of past signals and past realizations
of ~ ¼ taking the form hi;t = fxi;1; ~ ¼1;¢¢¢ ;xi;t¡1; ~ ¼t¡1;xi;tg. Denote by H the set of all such
histories. A strategy for player i is simply a mapping si : H ! fP;Ag. We give a few
structural results before discussing the framework.
De¯nition 1 (Order on strategies) We de¯ne a partial order ¹ on strategies as follows:
s ¹ s
0 () fa:s:8h 2 H;s(h) = P ) s
0(h) = Pg:
In words, one strategy is greater than another if and only if it is always more peaceful. Our
¯rst result establishes the existence of lowest and highest equilibria taking a simple form.
Lemma 1 (extreme equilibria) There exists ¾ > 0 such that
(i) For all ¾ > 0, attacking always is the lowest equilibrium strategy. It is asso-
ciated with the lowest pair of equilibrium values (Wi;W¡i).
(ii) For all ¾ 2 (0;¾), the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria admits a highest equi-
librium with respect to ¹, denoted by sH
¾ = (sH
i;¾;sH
¡i;¾). This highest equilibrium
is associated with the highest pair of equilibrium values VH
¾ = (V H
i;¾;V H
¡i;¾).
(iii) For all ¾ 2 (0;¾), sH
¾ is characterized by ¯xed thresholds (xH
i;¾;xH
¡i;¾) 2 R2
such that player i plays peace if and only if xi;t ¸ xH
i;¾.
This setup captures the idea of strategic risk in equilibrium by allowing players to have
di®erent perceptions of their environment. Although strategies are common knowledge in
equilibrium, the fact that perceptions are private implies that there is no common knowledge
of which actions will be taken. As a consequence, there is some risk of miscoordination
(outcome (P;A)) in equilibrium. This leads players to second guess each other's assessment
of the situation, and given that a surprise attack is always possible, preemptive incentives will
9play an important role in determining players' behavior. Moreover, as the next section shows,
preemptive incentives continue to matter signi¯cantly even when the players have arbitrarily
good information about ~ ¼t and the likelihood of actual miscoordination is vanishing. In that
sense preemptive incentives have a selection e®ect on what equilibrium players choose to
play, even when they do not enter payo®s on the equilibrium path directly.
2.3.3 Sustaining peace under strategic risk
We are now interested in the properties of game ¡¾;f when its payo®s and information struc-
ture become arbitrarily close to those of the complete information game ¡CI with constant
bene¯t ¼. For this purpose, we consider a sequence of distributions ffngn2N such that for
all n 2 N, fn has support (¡1;+1) and ffngn2N converges in mean to d¼, the degenerate
distribution that puts a unit mass at ¼. Then, we have
Proposition 2 (sustainability of peace under strategic risk) For each distribution fn
and noise level ¾ > 0, denote VH












































In words, peace is robust to the introduction of small amounts of incomplete information on ¼
if and only if (peace, peace) is the risk-dominant equilibrium of the 2£2 augmented one-shot
game in which the continuation value upon peace is that of permanent peace. If this isn't the
case and (attack, attack) is the risk-dominant equilibrium of the augmented one-shot game,
then immediate con°ict is the only equilibrium that's robust to the introduction of small
amounts of noise. Hence we say that cooperation is sustainable under strategic uncertainty











(Wi ¡ Si): (2)
Let us denote by ¼SU the smallest value of ¼ such that cooperation is sustainable under
strategic uncertainty. It is clear from (1) and (2) that ¼SU is always greater than ¼CI. In
other words, peace is always more di±cult to sustain under strategic risk. When payo®s are




¼ + W ¡ S < 0: (3)
Condition (3) makes very clear how introducing strategic risk will a®ect comparative statics
on the sustainability of peace. While only predatory incentives (F ¡ 1
1¡±¼) matter under
complete information, both predatory and preemptive incentives (W ¡ S) matter under
strategic risk. Whenever the two incentives move in di®erent directions, strategic risk will
signi¯cantly change our intuitions about the determinants of peace and con°ict.
2.4 A benchmark model
Most of the results given in the paper can and will be stated in terms of reduced form payo®s
F, W and S, however we ¯nd it useful for intuition to have a benchmark model of payo®s
upon con°ict.




(ii) F(ki;k¡i) = W(½Fki;½Sk¡i) and S(ki;k¡i) = W(½Ski;½Fk¡i)
where ½F > 1 > ½S ¸ 0.
The ¯rst term of W(ki;k¡i) corresponds to a classic contest function.13 It corresponds
to the idea that players are competing for a prize m and that the likelihood of obtaining m
13See for instance Hirshleifer (1995).
11depends on the relative stocks of arms. The second term D : R+ ! R+ is a continuously
di®erentiable increasing function that represents the amount of destruction incurred by player
i upon con°ict, independently on whether she wins prize m or not. We capture the strategic
advantage or disadvantage of being a ¯rst or a second mover by allowing weapon stocks to be
in°ated or de°ated by factors ½F and ½S depending on the timing of attacks. The di®erence
½F ¡1 is positive and corresponds to the ¯rst mover advantage; the di®erence 1 ¡½S is also
positive and corresponds to the second mover disadvantage.
As of now we don't specify D any further, but we think of it as bounded (i.e. in the
event of a complete nuclear holocaust, the number of atomic bombs used in the process does
not seem relevant for payo®s). D may also display convex parts. This is natural if as k
increases, both the quantity and the nature of weapons are changing. For instance, imagine
that a low capital stock k0 corresponds to the traditional weapons of a tribal society while
a higher capital stock k1 corresponds to the introduction of machine guns. In this case, a
marginal increase in capital stocks will have a much larger impact on damages D at capital
k1 than at capital k0. Altogether, the typical damage function we envision is bounded with
S-shaped portions.
3 Deterrence
3.1 Deterrence when weapon stocks are symmetric
3.1.1 General results
This section investigates how a symmetric increase in weapon stocks a®ects the sustainability
of peace. More precisely we will be studying the comparative statics of thresholds ¼CI and
¼SU. These thresholds correspond to the minimum °ow return to peace ¼ necessary for
peace to be sustainable. The lower these thresholds, the easier it is to sustain peace. We say
that weapons are deterrent if and only if the symmetric accumulation of weapons reduces
the minimum value of ¼ required to sustain peace. The following assumption is maintained
12throughout the paper.
Assumption 2 (weapons are destructive) Payo®s Fi, Si and Wi are increasing in ki
and decreasing in k¡i. Furthermore, F(k);S(k) and W(k) are all decreasing in k.
This is a natural assumption: conditional on con°ict, player i's payo® is increasing in her own
stock of weapons and decreasing in her opponent's stock of weapons. Moreover, a symmetric
increase in the amount of weapons makes con°ict more painful on all sides. Note that payo®s
F, S and W corresponding to the benchmark model of De¯nition 2 satisfy Assumption 2.
When ki = k¡i = k cooperation thresholds are ¼CI = (1¡±)F and ¼SU = (1¡±)[F +W ¡
S]. As discussed above, sustaining peace is always more di±cult under strategic uncertainty.
More interestingly, the deterrent e®ect of weapons may di®er across strategic settings.
Proposition 3 (deterrence under complete and incomplete information) Consider
a situation in which ki = k¡i = k. Under Assumption 2, we have that
(i) ¼CI is always strictly decreasing in k.










Point (i) of Proposition 3 highlights that in a complete information setting, increasing
weapon stocks unambiguously improves the sustainability of peace. This happens because
under complete information, peace is sustainable if and only if the payo® F of a ¯rst mover
attack is lower than the value of permanent peace 1
1¡±¼. Because accumulating weapons
decreases F, it also facilitates the sustainability of peace.
This prediction does not necessarily hold anymore once strategic risk is taken into ac-
count. Indeed under strategic risk the sustainability of peace depends both on the predatory
and the preemptive motive for con°ict. Hence, while an increase in weapons may reduce F,
it may also greatly worsen the payo®s of su®ering a surprise attack (starting con°ict as a
13second mover). This may increase the value of W ¡S, thereby increasing the temptation to
launch preemptive strikes. Whenever the cost S of being a second mover rises more steeply
than the cost W of simultaneous war and the cost F of initiating con°ict, weapons will be
destabilizing instead of deterring.
3.1.2 Deterrence in the benchmark model
To better understand the circumstances in which weapons will be destabilizing, we now
examine the meaning of condition (4) when con°ict payo®s are those of our benchmark
model. The threshold ¼SU takes the form
¼SU = (1 ¡ ±)[W(k;k) + W(½Fk;½Sk) ¡ W(½Sk;½Fk)]







m ¡ D(k) ¡ D(½Sk) + D(½Fk)
¸
:




0(½Fk) ´ Á > 0:
Accumulating weapons is counter-productive otherwise. The question is now to understand
what may a®ect the sign of Á. In particular we are interested in how the ¯rst strike advantage
½F ¡1 and the second strike disadvantage 1¡½S may a®ect the deterrent impact of weapons.
The e®ect of parameters ½F and ½S however is subtle and may depend on the shape of function
D.
Lemma 2 If D is convex over the range [½Sk;½Fk], then Á is decreasing in ½F and increasing
in ½S.
Lemma 2 suggest that a large ¯rst strike advantage and a large second strike disadvantage
will tend to make weapons destabilizing. A partial intuition goes as follows: if the ¯rst mover
advantage and the second mover disadvantage are large, it is likely that when weapon stocks
14increase the amount of destruction su®ered by second movers will rise by more than the
amount of destruction su®ered by a ¯rst mover. Hence when the ¯rst mover advantage and
second mover disadvantage are large, one should expect that weapons will be destabilizing.
Lemma 2 however is more subtle than this simple reasoning suggests, and the shape of D
also plays a role in determining whether weapons are destabilizing or not. Indeed, assume for
instance that D is concave around ½Fk. This means that the destruction su®ered by a second
mover increases at a diminishing rate when ½Fk increases. It follows that a further increase
in ½F will decrease the sensitivity of S to weapon stocks. Hence, if D is concave around ½Fk,
increasing the ¯rst mover advantage might improve the deterrent e®ect of weapons.
Because the deterrent e®ect of weapons depends on the local shape of the destruction
function D, the predictions of our model can potentially accommodate varied patterns of
deterrence. In the following section, we highlight that under reasonable assumptions our
model predicts that very destructive weapons (i.e. nukes) are deterrent while intermediate
weapons (i.e. guns) may be destabilizing.
3.2 Guns vs. Nukes
This section explores the possibility that di®erent levels of weapons may have di®erent
deterrent e®ects. We start by imposing a natural assumption on con°ict payo®s.
Assumption 3 (destruction) As weapon stocks become large, the payo® di®erence between
being a second mover and simultaneous con°ict is minimized:
lim
k!+1
W(k) ¡ S(k) = inf
k¸0
W(k) ¡ S(k)
This assumption corresponds to the idea that when weapon stocks are very large, the
gains from launching preemptive attacks are small. This is consistent with the idea of
mutually assured destruction. Imagine for instance that limk!+1 F(k) = limk!+1 W(k) =
limk!+1 S(k) = infk¸0 S(k). In that case, when weapon stocks are large, destruction is
15complete and payo®s upon con°ict are independent on who initiated the ¯rst attack. As a
result, neither predatory nor preemptive attacks make sense and incentives for con°ict are
minimized when destructive capacity is high. This yields the following result.
Proposition 4 (nukes are deterrent) If Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, peace is most sus-







Note that our benchmark model satis¯es Assumption 3 whenever the destruction function D
is bounded above. Hence, when weapon stocks are symmetric, su±ciently destructive power
will guarantee the highest possibly sustainable level of peace.
This result however does not imply that weapons monotonically increase stability in a
world with strategic risk. In fact we now consider a very stark example highlighting how
convexities in the destruction function D may cause intermediate stocks of weapons to be
destabilizing.
Assumption 4 (disruptive technology) There exists a weapon level k¤ such that D0(k¤) =
+1 while D0 < +1 everywhere else.
This assumption is consistent with D being S-shaped.
Proposition 5 (disruptive weapons precipitate war) Whenever Assumption 4 holds,
there exists an open interval I ½ R containing k¤=½F such that ¼SU is strictly increasing in
k over I.
When the joint stock of weapons is exactly k¤=½F, the destruction experienced by a second
mover is equal to D(k¤), hence a marginal increase in weapon stocks hurts a second mover
much more than a ¯rst mover. As a consequence, any marginal increase in destructive
capacity is destabilizing. While Assumption 4 facilitates the statement of Proposition 5, the
assumption that D0 be in¯nite for some stock of weapons k¤ is by no means necessary. For
16instance if function D was S-shaped with a su±ciently steep in°exion point a similar result
would hold.
It follows from this that the e®ect of weapons on con°ict may well be non-monotonic:
while very destructive weapons always have a deterrent e®ect, intermediate levels of weapons
can be destabilizing. This helps reconcile the seemingly contradictory evidence on the e®ect
of weapons on the sustainability of peace.
4 Stabilizing Inequality
In the previous section we have analyzed the case of two contenders with equal weapons
stocks. We now turn to the question of how inequality in military strength a®ects the
sustainability of peace. Inequality is parameterized by a constant ¸ 2 [1;+1) so that
ki = ¸k and k¡i = k: The following result is immediate.
Proposition 6 (inequality is bad under complete information) Keeping k constant,
greater inequality makes peace harder to sustain. More formally, ¼CI is increasing in ¸.
This follows simply from the fact that ¼CI = (1 ¡ ±)maxi2f1;2g Fi. As player i becomes
stronger, his payo® Fi from initiating con°ict increases and since only predatory incentives
matter under complete information, peace becomes harder to sustain.
In contrast, Proposition 7 below shows that in a setting with strategic uncertainty, in-
equality in military strength can facilitate peace rather than generate war. This comes from
the fact that while military inequality increases the stronger player's incentives to launch
predatory attacks, it also reduces both players' incentives to launch preemptive attacks. To
see this formally, we must compute threshold ¼SU. When weapon endowments are unequal,










= (Wi ¡ Si)(W¡i ¡ S¡i)
17that is also greater than (1 ¡ ±)maxi2f1;2g Fi.
We present our results in two steps. Lemmas 3 and 4 ¯rst provide conditions under
which the destabilizing impact of inequality is mitigated under strategic risk compared to
the complete information case. Proposition 7 then shows that under strategic uncertainty,
peace may be possible between unequal contenders while equally strong groups would end
up ¯ghting.
Lemma 3 (mitigated impact of inequality) Whenever (Wi¡Si)(W¡i¡S¡i) is decreas-







In words, whenever the product (Wi ¡ Si)(W¡i ¡ S¡i) is decreasing in ¸, strategic risk
dampens the adverse impact of inequality on the sustainability of peace.
The term Wi ¡ Si corresponds to player i's incentives to launch preemptive attacks.
The fact that the product of these preemptive incentives a®ect equilibrium selection can be
roughly assigned to the idea that the players' fear of su®ering a surprise attack compound.
Indeed, when the di®erence W¡i ¡ S¡i is large, player i may worry that player ¡i is likely
to launch a preemptive attack. This makes player i's own incentives to launch preemptive
strikes become more salient. As a result the e®ect of each player's preemptive incentives
are complementary.14 When the product of the preemptive incentives is decreasing in ¸,
inequality reduces the overall destabilizing e®ect of preemptive incentives. Next we show
that in our benchmark model, large levels of inequality will in fact minimize the preemptive
temptation.
Lemma 4 (appeasing inequality) Assume that con°ict payo®s F, S and W are gen-
erated by the benchmark model of De¯nition 2 and that D is bounded above. Then, the
preemptive incentives of both players i and ¡i are minimized when inequality parameter ¸
14For a more detailed discussion of why it is speci¯cally the product of preemptive incentives that matters,




Wi ¡ Si = inf
¸¸1
Wi ¡ Si and lim
¸!+1
W¡i ¡ S¡i = inf
¸¸1
W¡i ¡ S¡i:
It is interesting to note that both players' incentives to launch preemptive attacks can di-
minish with ¸. The stronger player's incentives diminish because she gets a share of the
spoils close to 1 whether she acts second or simultaneously. The weaker player's incentives
to launch preemptive attacks also diminish because when facing an overwhelmingly stronger
opponent, she obtains the same payo®s whether she is a second mover or attacks simultane-
ously. Proposition 7 now shows that this positive e®ect of inequality can be strong enough
that in some circumstances, peace is sustainable only when weapon stocks are su±ciently
unequal.















¼ > m ¡ D(½Sk) (6)
then under strategic risk, peace is unsustainable for ¸ = 1 but sustainable for ¸ = +1.
Proposition 7 provides conditions under which peace is not sustainable if both groups have
the same stock of weapons k but becomes sustainable if one of the players becomes over-
whelmingly strong.15 Condition (5) ensures that peace is not sustainable under strategic
risk when ¸ = 1. This simply corresponds to the negation of condition (3) for our bench-
mark model. Inversely, condition (6) implies that when a player becomes arbitrarily strong,
predatory attacks remain unattractive. When these conditions hold together then peace is
sustainable only if players are su±ciently unequal.
15For a given k and ½F, there is always a ½S small enough such that these two conditions hold simultane-
ously for some ¼.
19Note that the term corresponding to the players' preemptive incentives has dropped out
in inequality (6). The only term that matters now corresponds to the deviation temptation
of the stronger player. This highlights two important points: ¯rst, asymmetry can be sta-
bilizing because it rules out preemption as a motive for con°ict, second, for asymmetry to
be bene¯cial, it is still necessary for the weaker party to keep su±cient military capacity so
that predatory attacks are unattractive for the stronger player. In that sense, Proposition 7
relates to, but nuances, the idea that a monopoly of violence facilitates peace.
5 Con°ict and intervention
This section explores the impact of peace keeping interventions on the sustainability of
peace.16 First, note that if peace keeping interventions reestablished peace immediately,
it is clear they would be bene¯cial. However, problems arise if peace keeping operations
only reestablish peace with delay. Indeed, a complete information model would predict that
delayed peace keeping operations are in fact destabilizing. We show that this need not be
the case anymore under strategic risk.
To understand whether late intervention can be e®ective, we unbundle payo®s upon
con°ict as a discounted sum of °ow payo®s, and ask how the timing of third-party peace-
enforcing interventions a®ects peace and con°ict. We consider the case of symmetric weapon














where fftgt2N, fstgt2N and fwtgt2N are exogenously given streams of payo®s upon con°ict.
Peace keeping interventions are characterized by a date T, at which players anticipate that
16Note that we never consider the opportunity cost or direct social bene¯t of such peace keeping operations,
but rather focus on how they a®ect peace and con°ict. However, although we do not endeavor to do a full
°edged welfare assessment of interventionist policies, we think of our analysis as an important input for such
an assessment.
20civil war will be interrupted. Some settlement is then imposed and players obtain °ow payo®s






























When intervention occurs at time T, the minimum value of ¼ for peace to be sustainable
under complete information is
¼
T







For simplicity we make the following assumption.
Assumption 5 (con°ict as punishment) We assume that f0 > ¼ and for all t ¸ 1,
ft < ¼0.
This corresponds to the idea that there are short term bene¯ts to attacking followed by
painful con°ict payo®s. The following result shows how an expected intervention a®ects the
sustainability of peace under complete information.
Proposition 8 (intervention under complete information) Consider the complete in-
formation game in which intervention occurs at time T. The following hold,
(i) whenever T = 0, peace is sustainable for any value ¼ ¸ ¼0;
(ii) whenever T ¸ 1, then the cooperation threshold ¼T
CI is decreasing in T. Hence
if T ¸ 1, ¼T
CI is minimized for T = +1.
Point (i) of Proposition 8 highlights that if intervention were immediate, then peace would
be sustainable for any value of ¼. This happens because a ¯rst mover attacker never gets
the one shot bene¯t f0 but only ever gets settlement payo®s ¼0 · ¼. Point (ii) shows
21however that anticipating a delayed intervention is always destabilizing under complete in-
formation. Moreover it shows that if it is only feasible to intervene with some delay, then
arti¯cially increasing this response delay improves the sustainability of peace, to the point
that committing not to intervene sustains the highest level of peace.
We now examine the impact of intervention under strategic risk. The minimum value of
¼ for which cooperation is sustainable is
¼
T




t(ft + wt ¡ st) + ±
T¼
0:
Proposition 9 (intervention under strategic risk) If intervention occurs at time T then
under strategic risk, the following hold,
(i) whenever T = 0, peace is sustainable for any value ¼ > ¼0,
(ii) for any T ¸ 1, the cooperation threshold under strategic risk ¼T
SU is increasing
in T if and only if fT + wT ¡ sT > ¼0:
Point (ii) of Proposition 9 highlights that even when only delayed intervention is feasible, in-
tervention can facilitate the sustainability of peace and that arti¯cially increasing anticipated
delays may foster con°ict. This occurs because under strategic risk, intervention a®ects the
sustainability of peace via two channels. On the one hand it replaces °ow predatory payo®s
ft by ¼0 which is destabilizing. On the other hand, intervention replaces °ow preemptive
incentives wt¡st by 0, which is stabilizing. Whenever ft+wt¡st > ¼0 the second e®ect dom-
inates and the promise of intervention { even delayed { improves the sustainability of peace.
The following corollary reinterprets these results in the speci¯c case where °ow payo®s wt
upon simultaneous con°ict are constant.
Corollary 1 (converging and diverging con°icts) Assume that for all t ¸ 0, wt = w0.
We have that
(i) if ft ¡ st is increasing in t for all t ¸ 0, then ¼T
SU is increasing in T;
22(ii) if ft ¡ st is decreasing in t for all t ¸ 0 and there exists T ¤ such that fT¤ +
wT¤ ¡ sT¤ · ¼0, then for all T ¸ T ¤, ¼T
SU is decreasing in T.
Point (i) of Corollary 1 states that when °ow payo®s between ¯rst and second movers diverge
with time, the promise of intervention at some time T will always improve the stability of
peace, and that even if it is delayed, intervention should occur as early as possible. This
corresponds to a setting where the ¯rst mover advantage and second mover disadvantage are
durable, so that war becomes worse and worse for the victim of the ¯rst attack. In contrast,
point (ii) of Corollary 1 states that whenever °ow payo®s between ¯rst and second movers
converge { in other words, when the victims can e®ectively retaliate { then only the promise
of su±ciently early intervention can foster peace. If intervention cannot occur before some
delay T ¤, intervention unambiguously reduces the stability of peace. In this second case
the intuition obtained under complete information survives: intervention only improves the
sustainability of peace if it is expected to happen su±ciently early. If intervention can only
happen with delay greater than T ¤, then arti¯cial delay (or abstaining from intervening) will
improve the chances of peace. This suggests that intervention is most suited when con°icts
follow a diverging pattern.
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to contrast the mechanics of con°ict with and without strategic
risk. It shows that under complete information, the sustainability of peace depends only
on the players' predatory incentives. Under strategic risk however, the sustainability of
peace depends both on predatory and preemptive incentives. Taking strategic risk seriously
highlights the role of fear { rather than just temptation { in the determination of peace and
war. This changes intuitions about deterrence and intervention in a number of ways. We
focused on three particular insights.
First, while weapons are deterrent under complete information this need not be the case
under strategic risk. Indeed, while weapons diminish players' temptation to launch predatory
23attacks, they may also increase the temptation to launch preemptive attacks. As a result we
show that weapons need not always be deterrent. We show that under natural conditions,
su±ciently destructive weapons (i.e. nuclear warheads) will be deterrent, while intermediary
weapons (i.e. guns) may be destabilizing. In particular we highlight the danger of disruptive
weapons which hurt second movers much more than ¯rst movers in times of con°ict.
Our second set of results pertains to the impact of unequal military strength on con°ict.
We show that under strategic risk, inequality may very well facilitate the sustainability of
peace. Indeed, while inequality always increases one of the players' predatory temptation,
it may also decrease both players' preemptive incentives: if one of the contenders is over-
whelmingly stronger than the other, the timing of con°ict doesn't change payo®s by much.
As a result peace may be sustainable if groups are unequal and unsustainable if groups are
equal. The model however doesn't suggest that monopoly of violence sustains the highest
level of peace. Indeed, it is necessary in our framework that the weaker party keep su±cient
weapon stocks to dissuade the stronger party from unilateral attacks. This result suggests
that policies that attempt to level the playing ¯eld between con°icting groups may in fact
be misguided and that restrained superiority may foster the greatest level of peace.
Finally we consider the relationship between intervention and con°ict. We show that un-
der complete information, unless intervention occurs immediately, it will make peace harder
to sustain. This isn't true anymore under strategic risk as intervention may reduce players'
fear of being the victim of a surprise attack. More precisely, we show that when con°ict is
diverging, in the sense that second movers fare worse and worse compared to ¯rst movers,
then intervention will always facilitate the sustainability of peace. This result suggests that
interventionist policies may improve the sustainability of peace even though they appear to
worsen the players' predatory incentives.
The model we use to make these points is particularly simple. On the one hand, we view
this as a strength of the paper. It highlights the importance of strategic risk as a fundamen-
tal determinant of peace and con°ict, that can potentially yield rich comparative statics.
Intuitions from our model also apply to many di®erent circumstances of con°ict, whether it
24occurs between countries, armed groups within a country, or even between individuals. On
the other hand, because it is so simple, our model leaves open a number of questions which
need to be addressed if we are to gain a comprehensive understanding of the determinants
of war and peace. In particular, we think that endogenizing weapon stocks and linking the
economic bene¯ts of peace to investment and the likelihood of future con°ict are obvious
directions for future research.
A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Lemma 1: Since for all i 2 f1;2g, Fi > Wi > Si, the highest continuation value
player i can expect is maxfFi; 1
1¡±¼g. If peace is an equilibrium action for player i, this
implies that ¼ + ± maxfFi; 1
1¡±¼g ¸ Fi, which yields that necessarily 1
1¡±¼ ¸ Fi. Finally,
since Si < Wi, peace is an equilibrium action only if both players choose peace. This shows
that whenever peace is an equilibrium outcome, then for all i 2 f1;2g we have 1
1¡±¼ ¸ Fi.
The reverse implication is straightforward: whenever 1
1¡±¼ ¸ Fi, then being always peaceful
is an equilibrium. ¥
The proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 is inspired from Chassang (2007) and Chassang
(2008). However, because we have only one dominance region, the proofs must be adapted
in non-trivial ways. We ¯rst introduce some notation and prove intermediary results in
Lemmas 5 and 6.
De¯nition 3 For any pair of values (Vi;V¡i) 2 R we denote by xRD(Vi;V¡i) the risk-
dominant threshold of the one shot 2£2 game
P A
P x + ±Vi Si
A Fi Wi
which is de¯ned as the greatest solution of the second degree equation:
Y
i2f1;2g
(x + ±Vi ¡ Fi) =
Y
i2f1;2g
(Wi ¡ Si) (8)
25De¯nition 4 (i) A strategy si is said to take a threshold-form if and only if there
exists xi 2 R such that for all hi;t, si(hi;t) = P () xi;t ¸ xi. A strategy of
threshold x¡i will be denoted sx¡i.












Fi1s¡i=P + Wi1s¡i=A j hi;t;s¡i;t
¤
the payo®s17 player i expects upon playing P and A.
(iii) Given a strategy s¡i we denote by Vi;¾(s¡i) the value function that player i
obtains from best-replying to strategy s¡i.






(v) Given xi 2 R and Vi 2 R, for all ® 2 [¡2;2] we de¯ne b ¢i;¾(xi;®;Vi) =
¢i;¾(xi;sxi¡®¾;Vi):
Lemma 5 (intermediary results) There exists ¾ > 0 and · > 0 such that for all ¾ 2
(0;¾), all the following hold,
(i) Whenever s¡i is threshold-form and s0
¡i ¹ s¡i, then Vi;¾(s¡i) ¸ Vi;¾(s0
¡i).
(ii) Consider s¡i a threshold form strategy and s0




¡i)) ¸ 0 then ¢i;¾(hi;t;s¡i;Vi;¾(s¡i)) ¸ ¢i;¾(hi;t;s0
¡i;Vi;¾(s0
¡i))
(iii) For any Vi 2 [Wi; 1
1¡±¼] , whenever b ¢i;¾(xi;®;Vi) ¸ 0 then
@ ^ ¢i;¾
@xi > · and
@ ^ ¢i;¾
@® > 0: Furthermore, if in addition there exists V¡i 2 [W¡i; 1
1¡±¼] such that
¢¡i;¾(xi ¡ ®¾;¡®;V¡i) ¸ 0, then
@ ^ ¢i;¾
@® > ·:
Proof: We begin with point (i). Let us ¯rst show that whenever V is a constant and V 0 a















17We drop the ¾ subscript and the dependency on hi;t whenever doing so does not cause confusion.
26Indeed, since Fi > Wi it follows that UA
i;¾(s¡i) ¸ UA
i;¾(s0





¡i) then it must be that for some value of ~ ¼t with positive likelihood conditionally on
hi;t, ~ ¼t + ±V ¸ Fi. Since Fi > Si and ~ ¼t has support [xi;t ¡ ¾;xi;t + ¾] conditionally on hi;t,































Since for any strategy s00
¡i, the value Vi(s00







¡i)), inequality (9) implies that for all ¾ 2 (0;¾1),
Vi;¾(s¡i) ¸ Vi;¾(s0
¡i). This proves point (i).
We now turn to point (ii). From point (i), we know that Vi;¾(s¡i) ¸ Vi;¾(s¡i0). Also,
since Si ¡ Wi < 0, there exists, ¾2 > 0 such that for all ¾ 2 (0;¾2), ¢i;¾(hi;t;s0
¡i;V ) ¸ 0
implies that ~ ¼t + ±V ¡ Fi > Si ¡ Wi. This yields that
¢i;¾(hi;t;s¡i;Vi;¾(s¡i)) = E[(~ ¼t + ±Vi;¾(s¡i) ¡ Fi)1s¡i=P + (Si ¡ Wi)1s¡i=A j hi;t;s¡i]
¸ E[(~ ¼t + ±Vi;¾(s¡i) ¡ Fi)1s0




¸ E[(~ ¼t + ±Vi;¾(s
0
¡i) ¡ Fi)1s0









which yields point (ii).
We now turn to point (iii). Denote by f² and F² the distribution and c.d.f. of ²i;t and
de¯ne G² ´ 1 ¡ F². Recall that f denotes the distribution of ~ ¼t. We have that
¢i;¾(xi;®;Vi) = E
£





[(xi ¡ ¾u + ±Vi)F²(® + u) + (Si ¡ Wi)G²(® + u)]
f²(u)f(xi ¡ ¾u)
R 1




Since Si ¡ Wi < 0, there exists ¾3 > 0 and ¿ > 0 such that for all ¾ 2 (0;¾3), whenever
¢i;¾(xi;®;Vi) ¸ 0 then ® ¸ ¡2 + ¿. Otherwise F²(® + u) would be arbitrarily small and
we would have ¢i;¾(xi;®;Vi) < 0. Standard results on convolution products18 show that
18See for instance Lemma 8 of Chassang (2008)
27as ¾ goes to 0, the posterior ª¾(xi;u) converges uniformly to f"(u) and that @ª¾
@xi converges
uniformly to 0. This yields that there exists ¾4 and ·1 > 0 such that whenever ¾ 2 (0;¾4),
then
@¢i;¾
@xi > k1 > 0.
Now assume that we also have ¢¡i;¾(xi ¡ ®¾;¡®;V¡i) ¸ 0. Since S¡i ¡ W¡i < 0 there
exists ¾5 > 0 and ¿0 > 0 such that for all ¾ 2 (0;¾5), ¢¡i;¾(xi ¡ ®¾;¡®;V¡i) ¸ 0 implies
that ¡® ¸ ¡2 + ¿0. Altogether this implies that ® 2 [¡2 + ¿;2 ¡ ¿0]. From there, simple
algebra yields that there exists ¾6 > 0 and ·2 > 0 such that for all ¾ 2 (0;¾6),
@ ^ ¢i;¾
@® > ·2:
To conclude the proof, simply pick ¾ = mini2f1;¢¢¢;6g ¾i and · = min(·1;·2). ¥
Proof of Lemma 1: Point (i) is straightforward and simply results from the assumption
that for all i 2 f1;2g, S¡i < W¡i. Points (ii) and (iii) are more delicate and make extensive
use of Lemma 5. We prove (ii) and (iii) together.
Let us ¯rst show that if s¡i is a threshold-form strategy of threshold x¡i, then the best
reply to s¡i is also threshold form. The best reply to s¡i is to play peace if and only
if ¢i;¾(xi;t;s¡i;Vi;¾(s¡i)) ¸ 0. Since the value Vi;¾(s¡i) is constant, point (iii) of Lemma
5 holds and it follows from simple algebra that ¢i;¾(xi;t;s¡i;Vi;¾(s¡i)) ¸ 0 implies that
@¢i;¾
@xi > 0. This single crossing condition implies that the best reply is to play peace if and
only if xi;t ¸ xi where xi is the unique solution of ¢i;¾(xi;s¡i;Vi(s¡i)) = 0. Hence the best
reply to a threshold form equilibrium is a threshold form equilibrium.
Point (ii) of Lemma 5 also implies a form of monotone best reply. Consider s¡i and s0
¡i
two strategies and denote si and s0
i corresponding best replies of player i. Then whenever s¡i
is threshold-form and s0
¡i ¹ s¡i, then s0
i ¹ si (note that we also know that si is unique and
takes a threshold form). We call this property restricted monotone best-reply. It allows to
replicate part of the standard construction of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990).
Denote BRi;¾ and BR¡i;¾ the best-reply mappings and sP the strategy corresponding to
playing peace always. We construct the sequence f[BRi;¾ ± BR¡i;¾]k(sP)gk2N. Since sP is
threshold-form (with threshold ¡1) and is the highest possible strategy, this sequence is
a decreasing sequence of threshold form strategies. Restricted monotone best-reply implies
that it also converges to a strategy sH
i;¾ that is an upper bound to the set of equilibrium strate-
gies of player i. Furthermore, (sH
i;¾;sH
¡i;¾) is itself an equilibrium (where sH
¡i;¾ = BR¡i;¾(sH
i;¾))
which takes a threshold form. Point (i) of Lemma 5 implies that the associated values are
the highest equilibrium values. This concludes the proof. ¥
Let us now turn to the proof of Proposition 2. We begin by characterizing the most peaceful
equilibrium for ¯xed f as parameter ¾ goes to 0.
28Lemma 6 (characterizing the most peaceful equilibrium) For any x 2 R, de¯ne
Vi(x) =
1
1 ¡ ±prob(~ ¼ ¸ x)
[E(~ ¼1¼¸x) + ±prob(~ ¼ · x)Wi]
As ¾ goes to 0, xH
¾ converges to a symmetric pair (xH;xH) where xH is the smallest value x
such that for all i 2 f1;2g; x + ±Vi(x) ¸ Fi and
Y
i2f1;2g
(x + ±Vi(x) ¡ Fi) =
Y
i2f1;2g
(Wi ¡ Si) (10)
Proof of Lemma 6: We begin by showing the following result: for any upper bound
for values V 2 R, there exists ¾ > 0 such that for any ¾ 2 (0;¾), for any (Vi;V¡i) 2
[Wi;V ] £ [W¡i;V ], the one-shot global game with payo®s
P A
P ~ ¼t + ±Vi Si
A Fi Wi




Furthermore as ¾ goes to 0, the mapping x¤
¾ : R2 ! R2 converges uniformly over [Wi;V ] £
[W¡i;V ] to the mapping x¤ : (Vi;V¡i) 7! (xRD(Vi;V¡i);xRD(Vi;V¡i)).
The existence of a highest threshold form equilibrium results from point (ii) of Lemma
5. As in the dynamic case, one can prove a restricted for of monotone best-reply. Joint
with the fact that best-replies to threshold-form strategies are also threshold form, iterative
application of the best-reply mapping yields the result.
We now show uniform convergence. The proof uses point (iii) of Lemma 5. The equi-
librium threshold x¤




i;¾. The pair (xi;®) must solve
b ¢i;¾(xi;®;Vi) = 0 (11)
b ¢¡i;¾(xi ¡ ®¾;¡®;V¡i) = 0: (12)
As ¾ goes to 0, b ¢i;¾ converges uniformly to a mapping b ¢i. Using point (iii) of Lemma 5









29This implies that given xi there is at most a unique value ®¾(xi) such that ¢i;¾(xi;®¾(xi);Vi) =
0. Since
@ b ¢i;¾
@® > · > 0 we also have that ®¾(xi) converges uniformly to the unique solution
in ® of b ¢i(xi;®;Vi) = 0. Furthermore, it must be that ®¾(xi) is decreasing in xi. De¯ne
the mapping ³¾(xi) = b ¢¡i;¾(xi ¡ ®¾(xi)¾;¡®¾(xi);V¡i). The equilibrium threshold xi must
satisfy ³¾(xi) = 0. At any such xi, we have that ³¾ is strictly increasing with slope greater
than ·. Furthermore as ¾ goes to 0, ³¾ converges uniformly to a mapping ³. This yields that
as ¾ goes to 0, x¤
i;¾ must converge to the unique zero of ³. We know from the global games
literature that this unique zero is xRD(Vi;V¡i). This concludes the ¯rst part of the proof.
We now prove Lemma 6 itself. The highest equilibrium sH
¾ of the dynamic game is
associated with constant values VH
¾ and constant thresholds xH
¾ . This threshold has to
correspond to a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot augmented global game
P A
P ~ ¼t + ±V H
i;¾ Si
A Fi Wi
where payo®s are given for row player i. Furthermore since sH
¾ is the highest equilibrium of
the dynamic game, it must be that xH
¾ also corresponds to the highest equilibrium of the
one-shot augmented global game. Hence xH
¾ = x¤
¾(VH
¾ ). Let us denote by Vi;¾(x¡i) the value
player i obtains from best replying to a strategy sx¡i and V¾(x) = (Vi;¾(x¡i);V¡i;¾(xi)).
We have that VH
¾ = V¾(xH
¾ ). Together this yields that VH
¾ is the highest solution of the
¯xed point equation VH
¾ = V¾(x¤
¾(VH
¾ )): We know that x¤
¾ converges uniformly to the
symmetric pair (xRD;xRD). Furthermore V ¾
i (x) converges uniformly over any compact to
Vi(x). Hence as ¾ goes to 0, V H
¾ must converge to the highest solution VH of the ¯xed
point equation VH = V(xRD(VH)). Equivalently, xH
¾ must converge to the symmetric
pair (xH;xH) where xH is the smallest value such that xH = xRD(V(xH)). This yields
that indeed xH is the smallest value x such that for all i 2 f1;2g;x + ±Vi(x) ¸ Fi and
Q
i2f1;2g(x + ±Vi(x) ¡ Fi) =
Q
i2f1;2g(Wi ¡ Si), which concludes the proof. ¥
Using Lemma 6, Proposition 2 follows directly.
Proof of Proposition 2: As fn converges to the Dirac mass d¼, the mapping Vi;fn(x)
converges to the mapping Vi;d¼(x) = 1
1¡±¼1x·¼ + Wi1x>¼. The conditions of Proposition
2 simply correspond to whether ¼ > xRD(V(¼)) or ¼ < xRD(V(¼)). If ¼ > xRD(V(¼))
then the value of permanent peace generates a cooperation threshold below ¼ and hence
permanent peace is self sustainable. If on the other hand ¼ < xRD(V(¼)) then even the
30value of permanent peace generates a cooperation threshold above ¼ so that with very high
probability immediate con°ict occurs. This concludes the proof. ¥
A.2 Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Proposition 3: When ki = k¡i = k, we have that ¼CI = (1 ¡ ±)F(k) and
¼SU = (1 ¡ ±)[F(k) + W(k) ¡ S(k)]. Under Assumption 2, F is decreasing in k, and hence
¼CI is decreasing in k. Clearly, ¼SU is decreasing in k if and only if F 0(k)+W 0(k)¡S0(k) < 0.
¥
Proof of Lemma 2: Whenever D is convex over the range [½Sk;½Fk], then ½SD0(½Sk) is
increasing in ½S and ½FD0(½Fk) is increasing in ½F. Hence Á is decreasing in ½F and increas-
ing in ½S. ¥




¼SU(k) · (1 ¡ ±) inf
k¸0
F(k) + (1 ¡ ±) inf
k¸0
[W(k) ¡ S(k)]:
By Assumptions 2, and 3 we get that
inf
k¸0
¼SU(k) · (1 ¡ ±) lim
k!1
F(k) + (1 ¡ ±) lim
k!1
[W(k) ¡ S(k)] = lim
k!1
¼SU(k):
This concludes the proof. ¥
















Using Assumption 4 and the fact that ½F > 1 > ½S, we obtain that at k = k¤=½F,
d¼SU=dk = +1. Since ¼SU is continuously di®erentiable in k, this concludes the proof.
¥
Proof of Lemma 3 : Let us compute ¼SU explicitly in the case where ki may be di®erent










= (Wi ¡ Si)(W¡i ¡ S¡i)
that is also greater than maxi Fi. This yields that
¼SU =
Fi + F¡i +
p
(Fi ¡ F¡i)2 + 4(Wi ¡ Si)(W¡i ¡ S¡i)
2
which can be re written as
¼SU = ¼CI +
p




= ¼CI + ´
where ¼CI = (1 ¡ ±)maxfFi;F¡ig and
´ =
p
































Since ¹1 > 0, d¹1=d¸ > 0 and d¹2=d¸ · 0, we obtain that d´=d¸ < 0. This concludes the
proof. ¥
Proof of Lemma 4: In the benchmark model, we have that










Wi ¡ Si = ¡D(k) + D(½Fk) = inf
¸¸1
Wi ¡ Si:
We also have that






m ¡ D(¸k) + D(½F¸k) > 0:
32Since by assumption D is increasing in k and bounded above, this yields that
lim
¸!+1
W¡i ¡ S¡i = 0 = inf
¸¸1
W¡i ¡ S¡i:
This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7: When ¸ = 1, peace is sustainable under strategic risk if and only
if 1






m ¡ D(½Sk) +
1
2




Hence when condition (5) holds, peace is not sustainable under strategic risk.
When weapon stocks are asymmetric (¸ > 1), then peace is sustainable under strategic











(Wi ¡ Si): (13)
We have just shown that whenever D is bounded above, as ¸ goes to +1 the di®erence
W¡i¡S¡i goes to 0. Since for all ¸ ¸ 1, Fi ¸ F¡i and lim¸!+1 Fi = m¡D(½Sk), inequality
(13) boils down to
1
1 ¡ ±
¼ > m ¡ D(½Sk):
Hence condition (6) guarantees that as ¸ goes to +1, peace will be sustainable under strate-
gic uncertainty. This concludes the proof. ¥
A.3 Proofs for Section 5






t=T ±t¼0. Hence ¼
T+1
CI ¡¼T
CI = ±T(1¡±)(fT¡¼0). This concludes the proof. ¥




1¡±¼ ¡ Fi = 1
1¡±(¼ ¡ ¼0) > 0. This implies that (P;P) is indeed the risk-dominant
equilibrium of the augmented one-shot game.










SU = ±T(1 ¡ ±)(fT + wT ¡ sT ¡ ¼0), which concludes the proof. ¥
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